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lreland and Europe’s New Money
In 1990, the I’;SRI honoured me with an invitation to deliver
tile annual Gcary Lccture honouring thc memory of Dr Robert
Charles Geary, the eminent statistician and social scientist and
the I]rsl director of tile Institute. l do not know whether I lived
up to the expectations of my hosts, but I do know that their
wal-n~ and generous hospitality, and tile vivid interest in icleas
and debate more than did justice to h’eland’s faille as a
wonderful country.
Before entering tile discussion of European money, how to
get there and what it might do to Nol’th-Atlantic monetary
relations 1 wish to spend a nloment, by way of repentance, on
rny misreading of h’elancl’s economic prospects in 1988-89.
h’eland’s case serves well to introduce the topic of convergence
because of the ch’amatic progress achieved in the past few years.
A few years ago, when h’eland’s prospects did not seem
forlunate at all, I expressed the opinion that h-eland’s
stabilization had failed.I It is difficult to believe a less auspi-
cious time to make thai forecast. No sooner had the galleys
gone to press, then did the ’h’ish miracle’ develop: successful
incomes policy, less-lhan-German inllation, rn~tjor and sus-
tained budget correction, strong growth, arid a falling debt
ratio. Tile perspective of 1985-88 was a singularly unfortunate
time to assess what Ireland would look like only a few years
clown the road.
Of course, it would be a mistake to declare tile battle won.
The debt ratio remains high, growth is su’ongly dependent on
I. The essay in qu~:slion ~s wrilien in the summer of 1988, see I)ornbusch (1989).
~1,~’ di~;l:u~sillll (ill I]l~l[ OI1t:gfltlll, P~llt’i(:k ~’l~lnllhilll W~IS of COUlee right in
clnllhasizing Ih;ll I did lllll pul ~lllV weight on 11112 inlptlrtanl ch~lnges Ih~ll h;ls IN/ell
acc<mlplished aheady, The Medium-’l~rm Review of Iht; I’;SRI read well Ihe change
in wrilins in June 1989: "We pl’t~j~:cl +l i)allern <Jr +ust+lined gr~awlh Jill" tilt: next five
)’~zar iim’i~, 19~,9-9a.. The av~:l’ag¢ mmual growlh rale should be in the regklll of
5 per i:erll, ~,’ith higher gr{l~*lh ill 1990 and 1991 filllowiM by a ~;Iuwclllwn ~n ]~ltcl"
yl!lirs.’
Table 1: Ireland’s Successful Stabilization
1985-87     1988-90 1991:’
Growth 1.7 4.0 2.2
Intlation 4.2 3.2 3.0
Debt" 130.7 125.4 113.4
Primary Budget - 3.3 3.9 4.5
Unemployment 17.4 15.7 14.7
"Forecast, ’~l~t:r cenl of GI)P.
5,~urct: OECD.
external demand, real interest rates stay high, so will h’eland’s
which would mean continued pressure for primary surpluses to
stop debt t¥om rising (see Figure A). These concerns are justi-
fied but, no doubt, at this time all indicators point in the
direction of continued improvement.
The improvement in the financial outlook is clearly apparent
from the Ireland-Germany interest differential (see Figure B).
The differential has narrowed to less than two per cent. The
Irish currency is becoming almost as hard as the DM. This pro-
Figure A’, IREI~AND: REAL INTERI’]ST RATI’]
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grcss opens of course the question what else might be done to
bring interest rates down further. We return to that point later.
Perhaps most importantly, there has been a striking change
in the spirit with which Ireland views itself; there is a distinct
optimism and can-do atmosphere. Europe 9’2 is seen as an
opportunity that translates into such investments as the
Financial Centre -- a totally plausible initiative to take
advantage of the combination of moderate wages and profes-
sional skills for the growth clerical market which is becoming
internationally footloose.
The major questions ahead are three: First, will Europe’s
slump, caused by German anti-inflation policy, last and will it
be protracted enough to sap the current vigour of the Irish
economy. Second, if sterling unravels in a major way, can
Ireland stock to a DM exchange rate policy? Third, will
Eastern Europe offer a formidable competition for Ireland in
the area of manufacturing. On this last it may just turn out that
h’eland’s adjustment was singularly fortunate in timing --just
early enough to get ahead of the new competitors.
] Iurn nexl to the topic of my Geary Leclure, European
money and how to get there. I will also ask what implications
a European money might have for the dollar and the United
Slates.
European monetary and financial integration are on our
doorsteps.~ Significant progress has been made in bringing
about a convergence of inflation and, beyond the numbers,
convergence of stability-oriented economic policy. The question
now is how to carry the progress furthet~ One direclion is
institutional: The creation of a common Central Bank and the
setting of D-day tbr tim jump to a common money. The other
direction Ior change, and the one explored here, is more prag-
malic. It involves the narrowing of e~change margins and intro-
duction of par clearing among the European hard currency
countries. That progress need not await the disinflation of Italy
or Spain; it can proceed immediately.
The creation of common European monetary institutions is
one of the key developments in shaping the world financial
system of the 1990s. Is it correct thai European money is just
the last nail in the coffin of American financial hegemony? A
perusal of the key arguments suggests that the fears here are
vastly overrated: the United States does have serious problems,
but the dollar is the least of these, unless the mistake is made
to try and create a New Bretton Woods thai institutionalizes
dollar overvaluation.
Possibilities for a Rapid 7kansilion
A full European financial integration is not easy to achieve.
Politically it is attractive, but economically, ahhough diverg-
ences have narrowed, they do persist. Monetary integration is
often interpreted in terms of the loss of independency of mone-
tary policy and the creation of joint monetary institutions. But
in reality there is no longer dependent monetary policy in
Europe. The only question is whether exchange rates are or are
2. See I’]uropcan Qommisslon (1990) and I’~olkerts-Landau and Mathieson (1989).
not fixed which has little to do with monetary policy and is
rather a function of wage behaviour and fiscal policy. With
capital movement fully liberalized and exchange margins
shrinking, monetary policy will have to carry even more of a
burden, at even a higher price to public finance.
In most European countries the scope for significant mone-
tary independence has basically vanished. Exchange rate
expectations are governed by accumulated imbalances and loss
of competitiveness -- by political squabbles about who ’makes’
inflation and ",vho suffers’ from it -- not by short run monetary
policy. Monetary policy only serves to postpone exchange rate
crises, but it does so at an important cost to the budget and to
economic growth. For most European Monetary System
members monetary policy has basically become an instrument
for managing the balance of payments and only in the centre
country, German),, is it devoted to setting the EMS inflation
trend. Even in economies where there is no crisis in sight there
is invariably a concern for realignments in the system, and
hence the possibility of any particular country staying with the
average rather than with Germany. That in turn requires a level
of interest rates that includes a premium for the remote risk of
a depreciation.
Once it is recognized that monetary independence is gone
and that exchange rate realignments are costly, one can ask why
countries would not go ahead and abandon the pretence
altogether. In most cases the obstacles cited merely postpone,
and without much justification, the necessary adjustments and
the move to fixed rates. But that answer does not apply with
equal strength to all EC countries. Some like Greece, Portugal
or Spain are far out of line with the rest, and should therefore
receive separate and differentiated treatment that may stretch
over a number of years.
A more rapid implementation of a firmly committed
exchange rate policy is likely to be put in place for the core
countries. To avoid the fiscal costs associated with exchange and
with exchange rate uncertainty, governments in soft currency
countries can pressure for increasing exchange rate fixity. They
can immediately discard exchange rate margins altogether.
This would signal a much stronger commitments to fixed rates.
The strategy is attractive because it is already widely believed
in Europe that monetary policy is no longer effective, except to
provide financing for the external balance. European monetary
policy is made in Frankfi.n’t and any independence is not only
an illusion, but is also expensive in terms of domestic clebt
service. This is so because the option to conduct independent
monetary policy will be re/leered in higher interest rate.
There is no need at this stage for any joint institutions to
manage European money. Central Bank consultation, as it has
occurred in the past two or three years, can assure continuing
efforts at disintlation. But exchange rate fixity must become
more believed and for that purpose governments must take on
bigger actual commitments. The more governments put at
stake, the more credible their policy. The only issue is how to
rnanage the transition. That problem will be .just as difficult
two, three or five years fi’om now. It is always inconvenient to
give up an option. But, because governments retain the option,
capital markets retain the risk premium. Recognition of this
fact should lead governments to take the radical steps requirecl
to move within a short time span -- less than a year - to a fully
fixed rate.
In this spirit the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and France
should/ix their exchange rates to the DM without any margin. In
the case of Italy, the occasion should be used for re-
denomination to eliminate the excess of zeros from their
currency and achieve a simple 1:1 relation. How is such a
system implemented? Three institutional arrangements of the
payments mechanism helI) impose the fixed rate. First,
economic agents in the core group that adopted zero margins
should be allowed to write checks in any of the core group
currencies. Second, banks in the core group countries must
clear all checks at par, independent of origin or
denomination) Third, Central Banks should organize a core-
3. The provision of I:~r clearing wa,~ an essential innov;ltion associated with the
IZ’ederal Reserve sysIelll. The exililence o1’ a COllllllOn currt~ncy area, pl’ior Io Ihe
crc:~llo~l ol’ I)le federM R¢.~erve, ~’~ i)ol cnollg}l Io csl~Mish tlxe(I r~tes };.elwc’tr/)
vari£1us Cilies.
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group clearillg syste111, These Ihree arrallgemeflts would assure
that rates are in t~mt fixed at par. The only departure would
stem from a crisis in coni~dcnce.
Once a pragmmic fixed I’atc system has operated for a while,
the transition to an institutionalized monetary system would be
t;ar easier than it appears today. The purpose of describing the
transition process has been to highlight that this is where the
problems are, not in the design of the institutions that
uhimatcly protect the stability of money.
We next raise three questions about the suggested move to
eliminate margins: First, what is involved in the sacrifice of
monetary sovereignty? Second, are exchange rate margins
useful? Third, is it enough to eliminate margins in order to
implement integration of the payments mechanism?
The Illusion of A4onetary &verezgaO,
During the 1980s, high inflation countries in Europe did
their best to push their inflation rates down to German levels.
Franec atad Ireland, tbr example, fully succeeded. The success
at disinllation is very largely due to the acceptance of tight
monetary and fiscal polic)c These wcre invariably supple-
merited by incomes policy in the form of an EMS exchange rate
arrangemeat and wage agreements. Acceptance of German-
style monetarism was a sine qua non of the disinllation strategy:
monetary policy ’.’.,as there to defend the exchange rate and
realignments a~ best could compensate partially for loss of
compctitiveness.
Table 2: [nflation Perfommncg’
1982         1989        1991"
France 11.5 3.4 3.3
Germany 5.3 3.0 3.1
h’eland 14.9 3.9 3.0
Italy 16.9 6.3 6.4
Tim Netherlands 5.3 2. I 2,7
a{~](Insulllplit~il (]c~]gllorL bF(WI2CaSL
&mire: O l",(; 13.
The question now arises whether moving to fixed-fixed rates
involves a significant, or indeed, any loss of monetary
sovereignty. And if such a loss is involved, how should one
judge the trade-off. To determine this one must realize
monetary sovereignty has three dimensions: the leeway to
change the exchange rate; the revenue from z~noney creation;
and the ability to set short term interest rates. Monetary
integration has a bearing on each of these three.
Consider first the ability to change the exchange rate. The
great effort of the 1980s nol to move exchange rates, even when
employment considerations made a gain in competitiveness
very tempting, does suggest that the exchange rate has lost
much of its attraction as a stabilization tool. Real wages are
sticky downward and devaluation is no longer an attractive way
to try and resolve cyclical or even structural problems. An),
devaluation, without incomes policy, translates quickly into
inflationary pressure and immediately into higher interest rates
in anticipation of a wage-exchange rate cycle. Since it is not
clear whether a lasting real wage cut can be brought about.
Given that uncertainty, the inflation cost and the cost arising
from the loss in credibility in assets’ markets, devaluation is a
very precarious policy instrument among EMS partners.
A further consideration is this: If one country devalues, what
would prevent a situation of competitive devaluation. If France
devalues, why would Italy and Britain not follow? This is all the
more the case if a devaluation is the response to an external
shock rather than the remedy fox" a cumulative anad uhimately
stilling loss of competitiveness. Since rnaior shocks often tend
to be common shocks rather than country specific ones, the
hypothesis of successful competitive depreciation must be ruled
out not only on economic grounds but also on the grounds of
European polity?
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The sccond issue is seigniorage. The gains from money
creation are substantial in countries where intlation is moder-
alely high -- say 20 per cent per year I and financial institu-
tions are primitive. That is no longer the case for industrial
countries and where it is, the eagerness to get out of the
intlation trap seems well worth the loss of seignioragc. For
countries with moderate iMlation there need be no net loss in
seigniorage, at least to a first approxinlation. The COIllnlOn
European money (or the national moneys on a rigidly fixed
exchange rate) will still be issued and hence the proceeds from
money creation are there just as they were before. The sharing
of these gains or their earmarking fox" common i)urposcs is
simply a fiscal issue.
Finally there is narrow monetary sovereignty in tile form of
practising domestic interest rates diffi~rent from this abroad.
The room for interest rate policy has virtually disappeared:
Mitterand’s attempt a decade ago is ,,’,,ell remembered and since
then nobocly has triecl in the monetary area the line ’Damn the
torpedoes, full steam aheacl.’ France has monetary sovereignty
in the sense of being able to cut itS interest rates, but the
sovereignty comes at the price of an exchange rate crisis and a
collapse of the franc anti the sharp resurgence of intlation.
Monetary sovereignty is gone tile monlent there is exchange
rate targets and controls have disappeared. The 1980s are a
nionunlcnt to tile conscious~ public, determined abandonlncnt
of monetary sovereignty. The decline in French inflation, and
interest tales, is the market’s rewm’d lot demonstrating that the
country is no longer willing to exercise the monetary
sovereignty option.
It may well be argued that a country like France will have
more intluenee on its own interest rates in the exercise ol’jotnt
illOnetary polity than ill tile CtnTent state of aftSirs where the
COUlltry acts like a ti~llow, on watch anti on probation.
I1
Are there any Merits to Exchange Margins?
Exchange rate margins are a legacy of the gold standard.
They have slipped into modern exchange rate arrangements
seemingly without rnuch discussion. Certainly the question of
what is the optimal exchange rate margin is rarely asked and
even less frequently answered.5 Only in the very recent
discussion of target zones does the issue of margins make an
appearance at all and here mosdy in terms of their stabilizing
characteristics rather than as an optimizing problem in
currency management. [n practice, of course, the margins and
the credibility of the intervention commitment and capacity do
play a role in setting interest rate diflizrentials.
Historically, exchange rate margins emerged from the opera-
tion of the international gold standard. If the Bank of England
bought gold at x pounds per ounce and the Bank of France sold
gold at y fi’anes per ounce then the exchange rate of francs pet"
pound would be y/x. In fact the Bank of England practised a
small spread of 1.5 pence between buying and selling prices and
so did the Bank of France. As a result, some tluctuations
around par already become possible as a consequence of these
spreads. Further room for margins came from the cost of
shipping gold which included the actual shipping and handling
cost, insurance, and interest lost while gold was in transit.
"]’he operation of Central Banks and arbitragcurs under a
commodity standard, gave rise to modest margins within which
the exchange rate for drafts could depart from par before it
would become profitable to engage in actual gold shipments
rather than shipping claims. Specifically there were two ways to
make a remittance to France: buying a draft on Paris at the
current exchange rate or buying gold from the Bank of
England, shipping it to France, redeeming it for Francs at the
Banque de France, and using the proceeds to effect payment.
The buy and sell spreads of the Central Banks together with
interest and transport costs would define the maximum spread
of exchange rates relative to par.
5, See, ho~w’cl; ~*qut~dell (1964) alibi Arg), arid l’~recr 1972).
12
Exchange rate margins slipped into the fiat standard of the
postwar period apparently without much discussion. Monetary
authorities undertook to buy and sell their currencies in
exchange for dollars with a maximum spread of one per cent
around tile declared par. With foreign exchange taking the
form of credit balances in foreign banks, further spreads due to
transport cost interest and insurance disappeared+ Following
the period of flexible rates, in the emerging European
Monetary System, margins reappeared as ’limited flexibility’.
Narrow margins of" two per cent and the wider margins for
countries like Italy, Spain, or the UK whose inflation perform-
ance was far off-course.
In the building up of the Europcan Monetary System two
kinds of exchange rate commitments were undertaken. Some
countries, for example Italy, accepted a six per cent margin;
others, including Ireland undertook a much tighter commit-
ment. For given inflation diffcrentials the wider margin would,
of course, accommodate a longer period of inflation diffcrential
before new realignment would become necessary. On the other
hand, tbe wider margin also madc it more apparent that
accommodation was part of the strategy. The narrow margin,
by contrast, signalled the possibility of a tighter commitment to
fixed rates and a far lower willingness to accommodate. Not
surprisingly, independent of initial conditions, the countries
with wide margins still have the high rates of inflation.
Countries with low margins have cut their inflation rates to
German levels or below.
The interest in margins may come also in a non-inflationary
context. Exchange rate movements within fairly wide margins
offer the possibility of real exchange rate changes and
international interest differentials, both of whlch could be used
as stabilizing devices in a cyclical context. This argument is
often made in ScandinaviaY; Suppose a country experiences a
boom. Exchange appreciation within wide margins will help
directly control inflation via tim effect on import prices. It will
6. See Korkman (1990, 1991).
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also help because real appreciation reduces competitiveness in
the traded goods sector and hence slows the growth in demand
for domestic goods. Finally, when tile exchange rate is high,
then the likely course fro" growth is down. Hence high domestic
nominal interest rates are appropriate i’ronl the point of view
of internatimlal uncovercd interest arbitrage. These high rates
in turn will be high real rates. The wider the margin, the greater
the scope for depreciation as seen from tile top and hence the
wider the interest differential that can lye pracdsed before
monctary policy is defealcd by capital I]ows.
Without margins, the scope tbr andcyciical monetary policy
and tbr the stabilizing effects of real exchange rates would be
Inst. This argument is altogether persuasive. But it mtlst be
recognized that the story only becomes interesting if there is
reany scope for rnovemem. Very small margins have the incon-
venience of potentially wu’iable exchange rates without the
significant pay-off. Fro" larger margins, the scope for policy
effectiveness increases, but the integrating effects of fixed rates
are sacrificed.
Once it is accepted that exchange rate margins should be
small, as it is for most EMS members today, there is no reason
not to go all the way and abolish margins ahogethei: Imagine
then tot a moment a situation where Germany and France
agreed to abolish margins altogethel: With the slightest
departure from par -- measured in fractions of a fraction --
Central Banks woukl have to meet the excess demand or supply
of foreign exchange.
~l~ understand the mechanism, consider for a momenl the
Federal Reserve System. As part of the operauon of tile System,
tile Fc(I offers member banks ~he privilege of the wire-using free
of charge: rnoneys can be transferred on the books of tile Fed
from one hank to another. With zero margins, Central ganks
would offer the same service but with the additional feature of
accepting instructions to transfer oll demand either local
currency or foreign currency at a fixed rate. Tile private
market, because of the availability of foreign exchange at par
from the Central Banks would thercfore perform the arbiu’age
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function. If Central Banks in the wholesale market buy and sell
without margins, rates would not depart from par except for
transactions’ costs. At the wholesale level margins would be
virtually zero, at the retail level there might be a minor spread.
The counterpart of zero exchange rate margins is, of course,
t\lll equalization of interest rates.7 With the gradual dis-
appearance of devaluation as common policy action, interest
rate diffcremials have narrowed sharply. For example, in the
case of Belgium, as Table 3 shows, differentials for short-terms
assets had fallen to as little as half a percentage point by
mid-1991.
Table 3: Belgh~m-Germany Differential
(Per cent per year, 7¥easury Bills)
1988 1989 1990 1991"
3.0 2.2 1.5 0.5
~’mid-9 I
Source: [MF+
A world of strictly fixed exchange rates would, of course,
require that monetary policy of the co-operating Central Banks
be strictly joint. That may either mean that it is jointly exercised
or else that there be a well-defined pattern of leader and
tMlowers. But that is just as much the case these past few years
when there has been limited margins. France today does not
have the room for a significant exercise of monetary independ-
ence. What would be lost in the transition to zero margins
except perhaps the iBusion of rnonetary sovereignty? However,
gains could be made because zero margins create a far deeper
integration of markets. This is certainly the case if they are
combined, as we examine below with par clearing for cross
border payments.
7. A proviso musl be made herr to reserve ihe possibility of a rea[ignmenl as long as
~hcre is nlJ uniqut: currency. This is known as the ’l~cso probleln’ m ~ln cv~:nl nol
~l~s~,’~’ecI (such ~ls :l p~t~ devah, allon between 1954 and 1976) but not i,npo~slble
-- and h~:nce rellecl~:d in ~l forward dlscounl and :l rnodc~l inl~resl dill~renlia].
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Par Clearing
When the F’cderal Reserve System was created one of Ihe
very controversial issues was the introduction of par clearing:
member banks are required to collect checks drawn on other
banks at par, without charge or" fee.a Thus a $100 cheque on a
California bank deposits in a Boston bank will be credited at
$100. The obligation to clear cheques at par robbed banks of
a great line of business - charging handsome fees for clearing
out-of-town cheques. Exchange rates between various centres
were flexible; they depended on supply and demand. Thus, for
example, drafts in Boston on New Orleans or Chicago would
trade at a price reflecting demand and supply (including
seasonals!). The only limit on rates was set by the possibility of
shipping the claims physically, collecting them in the other
location, and shipping back the proceeds. The exchange
margins narrowed with the progress of transport, but they
remained until par clearing was imposed.~’
In Europe today the payments mechanism across borders is
extremely underdeveloped. The progress on common money
has not at all been accompanied by a serious discussion of a
payments mechanism that would assure fixed rates. Thus
introduction of par clearing for cross border transactions seems
an important agenda item both to make the monetary integra-
tion complete but also to enhance the Europe 1992 internal
market objectives. Only when a cheque can be put in the mail
payable at face value will there be significant market integra-
tion at the intermediate level. The situation today is a fat" cry
from par clearing since charges are as high as six pet" cent and
the delay for clearing cheques is long and random. As a resuh
of the [’cos and complications involved in cross-border pay-
mcnts, the effective exchange rate margins for retail level trans-
actions are of course far larger than the official limits.
8. See Hat’ding (1925) and Garbade and Sillier (1979).
9. It is interesting to note that as long as tile h’eland/UK t~Lte ’.+.’~ls I~xed Ihel’c wil~ ])at’
clearing betwet:n tile twtl countries. With the transition to a Iloating rllle p;lr
i:[earing vanished.
16
Wc next turn to the international consequences of increasing
European monelary integration. The key question here is what
the development of an integrated European market means for
thc dollar and tbr the United States in international finance.
Europe’s Money and the Future of the Dollar
The decline in the US net international creditor status, the
sharp loss in international competitiveness, the relative decline
of US financial institutions, botla in tcrnls of size and stahility,
all mark a watershed for the dollar as the dominant asset in
world finance. Monetary and financial integration underway in
Europe point clearly to a new world financial scene where a
European asset will emerge that is at least rival to the dollar,
if not dominant. Integration in Europe promotes this new asset
by a three-pronged approach: the creation of an integrated
financial area, naonetary integration, and the creation of a
Europe-wide payments mechanism.
If l’2nropean integration gives rise to a well-regulated and
inllation-stable asset, and if US financial performance con-
tinucs to deteriorate, then there will be clear problems for the
dollar and these ditticultics will e×acerbatc the diflicultics of
adjustment in the US economy in the 1990s.
European integration in the area of money, finance, and the
payrnents mechanism is far fi-om accomplished. The details are
not even decided and the question of the accompanying poli-
tical integration remains unresolved and controversial. But
even so, pragmatic progress in the direction of integration has
been underway for a decade and is irreversible. The attraction
of this area of financial stability Ibr the pcriphcry is clearly
indicated by the recent decisions in Finland, Sv.,eden, and
Austria to adopt EMS-pegged exchange rate regimes. With the
growth in intra-European trade, finance, and policies, the
central roles of the dollar in world finance is being eroded.
If this prediction is corFcct, a numher of questions emerge.
First, what are the costs to the United Stales of losing monetary
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hegemony. The conclusion here is that the costs arc unlikely to
be important. The chief reasons are two: US institutions do not
have an exclusive franchise on doing dollar-denominated busi-
ness and US dollar-denominated liabilities today are interest
bearing so that the gains fi’om their issues arc insignificant. In
other words, nobody is doing us a thvour by holding out debts.
The second question is: What special policies does the
United States need to cushion the fall from supremacy?
Specifically, should the United States try and forestall the
course of events by a major international currency proposal?
The answer here is emphatically no. We should stay with a
flexible exchange rate and avoid landing up with an overvalued
currency as a result of a misled emphasis on having a hard
currency,
Dollar Dominance
The predominant position of the dollar in world finance is
represented by its use as a ’vehicle currency’.’" Trade is
invoicecl in dollars, world trade is financed with dollar credits,
dollar balances are held by corporations world wide, and dollar
instruments are held by official agencies, banks abroad, and by
institutional and individual investors. Cross-border lending,
sovereign and private is doflar-denominated. Dollar cash serves
as stable money throughout Latin America, in Poland, in Asia,
and in underground markets worldwide.
It is clear that none of these functions is performed exclusively
by the dollar. Some trade is invoiced in yen or in DM or even
in sterling. Credits for trade financing or cross-border lending
do also take the form of DM or yen loans. But even today, after
dollar weakness and nearly 20 years of floating exchange rates
and an increasing net debtor status for the United States, the
dollar predominance remains. In part it is merely a reflection
of the relative size of the US economy. The US is by far the
largest economy in the world.
10. Oil the concept of vehicle currencies sc-e Swobtxln (1968).
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Table 4: Economic Size
(Share of I’Vorld GNP)
Industrial Countries
Eu rope 29.6
.Japan 15.3
United States 27.1
Canada 2.7
Developing Countries
Afi’ica 2.2
Asia 7.2
Europe 6.0
M. East 2.6
L. America 5.7
E. Europe 1.6
USSR 4.0
.%urre: IMF IVorld I-conomic Outlook.
No other financial market has the sheer size, the variety of
instruments, the degree of competition, and thc international
openness. Hence the predominance. Moreover, the US capital
market is wide open to cross border transactions without
control or red tape; exchange controls have never existed in this
century; clear Icgal processes apply in a US jurisdiction;
taxation of capital income for non-residents is modest if not
absent ahogether; cornpetition and efficiency make Ibr low
transactions’ costs. Tim closest rival, Japan, cannot offer these
advantages." There is not only the much smaller size but also
clannish restrictions on competition especially by foreigners,
exchange control until very recently, anti uncertainty about
Japan’s long-term role in relation to the Western world. These
factors stand in the way of the confidence required for a major
international role of tim yen. That is not to say that Japan does
not have clcep pockets, but it does limit the role of Japan’s
capital market and the yen as an international asset.
Europe’s Competition
The developments in Europe open up genuine possibilities
[br a competitor to time dollar. Over the past decadc Europe has
evolved into a hard currency region, centred on the Deutsche
11. See, h~wevet; "l]t’.’las and Ozcki (1991).
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Mark. The initial cotnmitnaent was mostly a device for
Germany to avoid sharp appreciation relative to its chief
trading partners. For the weaker currencies the EMS was a
means to cut inflation by a tough stance on exchange rates.
Realignments in the EMS have become increasingly infre-
quent and membership, tbrmal or intbrmal, has been spread-
ing. Until 1986 there were basically annual realignments
involving most currencies. Since thcn there have only been
three realignments and none in the past 18 months. Thus
exchange rates have become far firmer.
A further development leading to the use of a European
currency as a vehicle currency has been the narrowing of
margins in the EMS. Cotlntrics which had no specific margins
like Spain adopted commitments, countries like Italy that had
wide margins have narrowed them, and ambitious countries
like Belgium have narrowed tbeir margins to less than one per
cent. Countries outside the community, notably Scandinavia
and Austria, have started pegging their currencies to the EMS.
The fact then is that Europe has become a centre of gravity and
that the stable DM-Franc relation is the centre of that emerging
block.
Against the background, further institutional integration is
now being planned. This integration falls into three areas.
-- The Creation of a Common European Money Managed by a
European Central Bank. So far there is only a system of fixed
exchange rates. But Ihc transition to the more ambitious
scheme is already quite far advanced. The blueprint for a
Central Bank is ready and the intergovernmental conference to
change the EC qYeaty is scheduled. The chief question
concerns the exact timing, or the exact preconditions, for the
move fi’om the current informal fixed rate system to a single
money.
-- A Better Payments’ Mechanism. Having a single money does
not in and of itself deliver an efficient payments mechanism.
The payments’ mechanism is still cumbersome if not primitive
and as such an obstacle to trade. But par clearing is certainly
going to be a by-product of common money and it may even
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come belorc, as an aspect of Ihc internal market. Once par
clearing lakes place, European money becomes a highly useful
money.
-- Under lhe Heading oJ- lhe "lnlernal Market" Programme Cross
Border Liberalisa~ion of l:’inancial Services is 72zking Place. It is
expected that increased competition will reduce dramatically
the u’ansactions’ costs for all kinds of financial transactions
fronl instlrance and underwriting to interest costs on COI]SUIIIeF
loans. Among the efficiency gains to be derived fl’om the
internal market, die improvement in financial efficiency counts
Ibr two-thirds of the benclhs.
With financial integration inevitably will come the creation
of new fioancial assets that exploit the large scale of the new
European capital market. The creation of a European commer-
cial paper market and a broacl market for public debt will not
take long. Because of the economic size of the market, and /he
competition allowed and encouraged, the assets arc bound to he
riwds to dollar clenominated securities. And markets thai
emerge will be important competitors to US located financial
markets.
Costs Zo ¢he US
What are the costs to the United States of competition from
a European money and an efl~ciem financial nlarket?12 The
costs are thrcetbld.
The world demand tbr US currency and bank balance held
in dollars will decline, at least relative to a trend without these
European developments. That implies a tall in the demand for
the US monetary base and hence a loss ofseigniorage revenue.
The crcadon of a usable European money will divert demand
away from dollars as the universal second (or lirst) hand-to-
hand currency. Of course, in Latin America, the dollar will still
serve that funclion, but presumably much less in Asia or in
Europe itself’. Also as a store of value, for households in politic-
ally or economically unstable countries or for the underground,
dollar balances now have competition.
It is very difficuh to know just how much US cm’rcncy is held
today abroad. It is even more diff]cuh to know how much of a
diversion toward the EMU might be expected. In the 1980s the
revenue from seigniorage was on average 0.37 per cent of GNP
lbr the monetary base and 0.32 per cent of GNP for currency.
Thus one is not talking of really big numbers. As a guess, with
the development of an EMU the seigniorage revenue might fall
by 0.1 per cent.
There is the additional question of a once and for all shift out
of US currency into the EC;U. For better or worse, such substi-
tution never occurs fi-om one clay to the next but rather Ibllows
a logistic curve. Thus an overnigbt collapse of demand for US
high powered money is unlikely. In any event, total currency
outstanding is only $250 billion. Suppose that one-third of that
demancl might be affected by currency substitution toward the
EMU and that it were to decline by 50 per cent, that still only
represents a fall in demand of $31 billion. In terms of asset
market shocks that is a rather small magnitude. Table 5 shows
the US net external position to put the numbers in perspective.
There has traditionally been a concern with the possibility of
dollar overhang, especially with respect to foreign official
holdings ofclollar assets. The right view to take here is that the
difference between corporate treasurercs and the managers of
Table 5: US Net Foreign lnoestment PoJ’ilion
(Billion $)
1980 1990
Net US position 333 - 412
US assets abroad 922 1,764
Direct investment 385 598
Foreign assets in the US 542 2,176
Official assets 176 370
Direct investment 124 466
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foreign of Jicial reserve holdings has become mino~= Both are
out to make protits and weigh interest differentials against
capital gains or losses from exchange rate movements.
There is no overhang. "lbday interest /’ales are just high
e~lough to make official and private investors hold the outstand-
ing stock of dollar securities. But these positions are by no
means fi’ozen. Safe haven considerations might overnight lead
to a massive shift in dollar assets. By contrast, loss of confidence
in US monetary management could bring about a flight oul of
US assets in no lime. There is no sl)eci~d concern for foreign
ofl]cial holdings of dollar assets if only because today they
represent a smafl shave of US external liabilities.
The second area where a US loss might occur is in relation
to the z’isk i)remium charged on doflar denominated assets.
Portlblio holders for securities of which there is a larger
quantity outstanding than belongs into a maximally diversified
portfolio. If the creation of a European money creates an asset
[hat recluces the clcmand for clollars then an increased premium
will be charged Ibr holding dollar assets. The financial area
where the dollar is the nauural currency will therefore experi-
ence an increase in the cost of capital. "lb sonac extent this can
be avoicled by issuing 1"2MU clenominatecl claims, but that will
not be convenient Ibr everybody. Hence, there will be some
loss, just how much is hard to know. Models based on portfolio
ctivel’sil]cation suggest a fraction of a per cent. In the aggregate
thai rcprcsents a substanlial transfer ~lway from the issuers of
doll~lr denominated claims.
The reduced cost of capital has implications for banks that
operate substantially in the EMU mode. Their privileged
access to capital allows them to compete more effectively for
good loans. The resuhing in~provemena in their portfolios feeds
back I~lvotn’ably to improve yet further their cost of capital. US
fin:racial institucions whose hal~itat is the dollzlr will, as a result,
experience a deterioration in their capital market position.
"rhe reduced c~q~ilal costs and the reduced costs of all
fina,acial services ~md transactions inct’ease the competitiveness
of 1’2uropean firms relative to those in the US. Working in a
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more efficient financial system, and possibly in a more stable
one, simply means higher compctMvcncss.
The third area where losses will occur is in financial services.
"lb d~e extent that financial industries in the US have a privi-
leged franchise Ibr dollar business, the creation of rival assets
and rival centres will cause a loss. The size of this loss is difficuh
to judge. In the first place, US financial firms will actively
participate in the European and world wide-business. But, even
so, financial liberalization works primarily to increase the scope
of European-located institutions.
The fourth area involves a change in the role of the US as
a provider of stable money. It is Otle thitlg to have a rival, it is
another if that rival produces a superior money. It is quite
possible that in the 1990s there will be a Europeml money arid
that this money will acl like the DM and hence be far better
than the dollar. This currency could lead, once and for all, to
a shift away from the dollar with all the ramifications which a
shift entails.
A positive effect of the rise of 1"2uropean money is Ihe Fact that
it provides Eastern Europe with a plausible alternative to their
own money,c~ Use of Western European currency may allow
the Eastern Europeans to avoid Latin American style hyper-
inflation and the accompanying social and economic problems.
A zVezt., 13retlon H/oods?
For the US the chief question is what exchange rate policy to
adopt in the face of these European developments. There are
two choices. One is to move aggressively for a system of fixed
exchange rates, on a parallel track with the European rnonetary
unifications, the other is to maintain Ilexibility of rates as an
important cushion.
In the fixed rate option, as Europe is moving closer together,
but the US is not allowing the North Atlantic gap to widen but
rather urges a narrowing in the style of Bretton Woods. This
15. Set: on Illis issue Associ:llkm Ibr t~.url)l~an Monetary Union of I[uml~: (1991).
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would rccluire co-ordination of monetary policy between the
European Central Bank and tile US. All the dilemmas of the.
1960s would re-emerge, more so if the US has problems whh
growth and gets caught between tile objectives of competitive-
nest and price stability. The greatest risk is that the lixing
exchange rates locks the US into a level of competitiveness that
is incompatible with gi’owth. That risk is more possible once
budget cutting gets unclerway, rlSday’s level of the dollar is far
from competitive as an engine of growth (see Figure C).
The ahcrnative is managed tlexible rates. The managed part
would involve accommodmlng shifts in the demand for money
by co-ordinated, sterilized intervention. This is precisely the
kind of sterilization required when current substitution is the
issue. Beyond that accommodation of money demand shifts,
exchange rale policy shoulcl be such as to sustain full employ-
mcnt. That means a substantially improvecl budget, low real
interest rates, and a cheap clollar. It would be a serious mistake
to make the dollar extra hard at the expense of full employ-
men’.. Such a policy would not last and would merely imply
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even higher interest rates and worsening problems of financial
institutions.
The strengthening of Europe’s money is moderately bad
news for the United States. The spill-over effects to the US in
terms of direct losses in scigniorage or in business opportunities
arc present but not dramatic. However, there are larger costs.
These come from the appearance, in world business and
politics, of a dynamic Europe in contrast to a staggering United
States. The European developments therefore make finding a
cure to our basic problems - deficits, education, productivity,
financial stability - even more important. This cure is best done
by attacking the basics, not by opting for a hard exchange rate.
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